The renewables sector and particularly offshore wind energy is a fast developing industry over the last few years. Especially, activities related to the installation, and operation and maintenance of offshore wind turbines become a challenging task with inherent risks. This article assesses the risks related to the above stages of a wind farm lifecycle using the failure mode, effects and criticality analysis and hazard identification methods. All works, from installation to operation and maintenance, are considered together with the wind turbine main components. An integrated risk analysis methodology is presented addressing personnel Safety (S), Environmental impact (E), Asset integrity (A), and Operation (O). The above is supplemented by a cost analysis with the aid of Bayesian belief networks method to assist the decision-making process related to installation, and operation and maintenance tasks. All major risks and critical wind turbine components are identified as well as measures are suggested to prevent or mitigate them. Moreover, inspection and maintenance plans are elaborated in general for the mentioned activities.
Introduction
Wind power is known to humans since ancient times. It is a form of energy that not only has no time or place restrictions, but it also contributes in reducing greenhouse gases emission and boosting the economy of countries that depend on oil and gas imports for the energy coverage. 1 These characteristics make it appealing to industry that tries to exploit it by developing more and more onshore or offshore wind farms. 2 The rapidly expanding number of wind farms makes quantifying and managing the different elements of risk that are present in each of the installation and operation and maintenance stages of a wind turbine necessary. In this respect, risk analysis and decision-making can be a key that will enable fast growth, investments, further technological development, and reasonable cost of energy.
This article presents the study regarding the investigation and assessment of the risk and reliability features of offshore wind turbines at different stages of its lifetime and identification of the critical components in terms of their operation to increase their availability and operability characteristics. A lot of risk analysis methods formerly or currently used in the offshore renewables and oil and gas sectors is examined as shown in section ''Literature review.'' The description of wind turbine and the demobilization of its components are demonstrated comprehensively in section ''Methodology,'' as well as the overall risk analysis methodology, including the hazard identification (HAZID) and failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) approaches, which are complemented with risk matrices for various consequence categories. Also, the cost-benefit analysis with Bayesian belief networks (BBNs) is presented in the same section. In section ''Results,'' the outcomes of the analyses and the simulations are submitted highlighting the possible high-risk areas and the most costly components. Finally, conclusions and recommendations for future research on this study are shown in the final section.
Literature review
Risk is defined in a different way by each one of us so there is no universal definition of ''risk.'' Generally, it includes a combination of probabilities of occurrence and consequences of an unwanted outcome. [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Consequences can be loss of life, injuries, environmental, social, and economic impacts. [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] Other views focus on both positive and negative aspects of risk 7, 8, 13, 14 and argue that one should not eliminate the other.
Hazard is associated with risk but they are not the same. According to World Health Organization (WHO), 5 hazard is the ''Inherent property of an agent or situation having the potential to cause adverse effects when an organism, system, or (sub) population is exposed to that agent.'' Similarly, the previous stuides 8, 11, 12, [15] [16] [17] describe hazard as situation likely to cause harm, injuries, and damage. So while ''hazard is any source of potential damage, harm or adverse health effects on something or someone under certain conditions,'' ''risk is the chance or probability that something or someone will experience an adverse effect if exposed to a hazard. '' 18 A probability is the way we have to express quantitatively the likelihood of an event or consequence to happen. According to past papers, [6] [7] [8] 11 probability can be either a subjective measure of uncertainty if it comes from expert's judgment, or a classical statistical approach. Determination of a probability and decisionmaking in each case involves a certain degree of uncertainty that derives from our lack of important information. 8, 10, 18, 19 Decision makers are faced with uncertainty either when the probabilities or the consequences are unknown or there are multiple outcomes for each alternative, 8, 10, [19] [20] [21] [22] The subject of risk analysis, risk assessment, and risk management in general is a relatively new but extensively explored area with various studies contributing to its thorough examination. Effective risk mitigation is desirable by all individuals and companies, and risk management is or should be applied to all stages of a project lifetime. 23 Especially, in the maritime and offshore industry, the aim is to reduce the risks from major hazards that could jeopardize the integrity of the offshore structure and the health and safety of the workforce and ensure the protection of the environment. 24, 25 The correct identification of hazards and their consequences is a key issue in providing information to aid decision-making and increase the level of project success. Thus, there are many tools, processes, techniques, and methodologies developed to cover this need as shown in Lazakis et al. 29 in which guidelines are given to operators of each offshore installation field for ''reducing the risks from major accident hazards to the health and safety of the workforce employed on offshore installations or in connected activities.'' After that, many standards and codes have been established the last years as guidelines for this purpose. Although they refer mainly to the oil industry, they can also be applied in the wind industry sector. 37 All the above tools and methods can be applied in the offshore wind sector. Some of the most prominent ones include FMECA and HAZID approach, which are used in the present paper.
After all the necessary information about possible risks is gathered, risk evaluation is executed. The most well-known principle used in risk evaluation is the as low as reasonably practical (ALARP) one. The key concept is that the risk should be minimized to a point where it is acceptable but without expending grossly disproportionate cost, time, and effort. 38 Regarding decision making, considering risk mitigation together with the ALARP principle, BBNs is a powerful tool that allows for modeling under uncertainty using conditional probabilistic calculations and graphical representation of the logical relationships among a number of different system variables.
Risk management process, in general, includes setting up the context, assessing the risk (HAZID, risk analysis, and risk weighing), handling the risks, monitoring, communication and consultation, as well as the connection between these procedures. The efficiency of risk management depends on the selection of the risk method. The suitability of each method depends on its strengths and weaknesses and on the needs of the project. Usually, two or more methods are combined to cover all stages or needs of a project's lifecycle and each other's weaknesses and flaws. This procedure has also been followed here. HAZID cannot support much detail and it is usually used for operational procedures. FMECA's complexity and the ever-increasing list of possible failure modes of the components make it difficult to be widely applied. A spherical and general overview though of both mechanical and operational aspects of an offshore wind turbine can be obtained when combining these two methods. Additionally, a financial perspective on the cost of critical components and their failure probabilities can be assessed through BBN analysis.
FMEA/FMECA-HAZID
FMEA is one of the first systematic techniques used to identify problem that may originate from system malfunctions. The concept of FMEA is reviewing all the components of a system and the causes or the ways in which a system can fail (failure mode) and then the consequence of these failures. The consequences can be categorized in terms of safety, reliability, and environmental effect. 8, 11, 17, 39, 40 FMECA is the extended model of FMEA so that criticality is taken into account. It is mainly used to rank the failure mode based on the severity of their consequences. FMEA/FMECA is usually qualitative or semi-quantitative and can be applied at any phase of project lifecycle preferably at the early stages of a project since the designers can have the ability to change the probabilities of the critical failures. 8, 39 FMECA was originally part of risk management techniques developed for defense and nuclear industries in the 1940s. It was formally developed and applied by National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the 1960s to guarantee reliability of space program hardware and was quickly adopted by aerospace, petroleum, chemical, and automotive industries. 41 FMEA and FMECA typically consist of several stages. Definition of the system components is the first step of the analysis. Then, identification of each component's failure mode as well as their effects is the next crucial level to the FMEA/FMECA approach. Next important step is analyzing the criticality of each failure and also estimating their rate. Ranking of failure modes and determination of critical items is another important stage of the procedure that due to the subjectivity of the applier a lot of attention and thorough review of the parameters need to be implemented. Design process then absorbs the method's results and helps identifying means of future reviewing and suggesting improvements in design.
Depending on the analysis we want to conduct, a proper FMECA worksheet has to be formed. A representative worksheet is presented below where the name, function, and operational mode of each element are mentioned and also all potential failure modes for each function and operational mode. Also, the failure mechanisms (corrosion, erosion, fatigue, etc.) for each failure mode have to be listed and their acceptance criteria have to be chosen. Before the final decision of the criteria categories, a lot of reviews and papers were taken into consideration. Main references were IMO and ISO sources on the development of risk matrices, Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) applications, and nuclear projects, where number of cases is small and technology may be obsolete but due to catastrophic consequences their outcomes must be taken into serious consideration. After thorough review, we finalized our matrices as below. 15, 24, 32, 42 The likelihood of their detection was evaluated with a ranking that is usually divided into five categories: 1 (almost impossible), 2 (low), 3 (moderate), 4 (high), and 5 (almost certain). The effects that a failure may have on the subsystem itself or on other components as well as failure rates should also be listed and classified most commonly to a five-level ranking: 1 (highly unlikely), 2 (remote), 3 (occasional), 4 (probable), and 5 (very frequent). The severity of the failure modes regarding the global effects has to be evaluated and ranked into five categories that in most cases, for computational reasons, are represented from numbers 1 to 5 representing: 1 (minor), 2 (marginal), 3 (major), 4 (critical), and 5 (catastrophic). It can be assumed here that categories are related with 1 fatality to equal 10 major injuries and 100 minor ones. Finally, mitigation measures that could prevent failure should be mentioned.
The risks linked to failure modes is a function of frequency of the failure mode and consequences of the outcomes and can be presented in the form of a risk ranking matrix to prioritize those that need immediate management.
An alternative to risk ranking matrix is the risk priority number (RPN) which is defined as
where S is the rank of severity of the failure mode taken from the severity matrix, O is the rank of occurrence of the failure mode taken from the occurrence matrix, and D is the rank of detection of the failure mode taken from the detection matrix. The RPN is not a measure of risk, but of risk priority. The smaller the RPN is the better since you can deal with this hazard later. Based on these two tools, the responsible team should decide whether the system is acceptable or not and propose improvements that will reduce the likelihood of occurrence of failure, reduce the consequences of failure, or increase the failure detection probability. After the improvements, the FMECA worksheets and RPN have to be revised and updated. 43 The main drawbacks of FMECA method are the limitation in examination of human and other external factors, as well as focusing on a single initiating event and on the mode of operation. Furthermore, analysis is mainly based on team experience on evaluating the failure modes of the components inducting subjectivity in the procedure. 44 HAZID is one of the most common and frequently used techniques for HAZID being carried out at the first stages of a project where not much detail is required. 8, 11 In HAZID, the process is divided into nodes and with the aid of predefined guidewords for HAZID, all undesirable consequences associated with the defined node are identified. Consequences are divided into broad categories such as human impacts, environmental impacts, and economic impacts that are then divided into subcategories based on the type of consequence. Checklists from previous similar HAZID can be used to assist the procedures. The same methodology as the FMECA is followed and risk matrices are constructed as well. Its application is wide: from marine and offshore industries to nuclear sector.
Since HAZID is applied to all aspects and operations and a complete evaluation of all hazards is performed, an extended list of potential hazards and recommendations for avoidance is produced. To this respect, a welldefined system or activity is required to minimize time needed for the analysis. 44, 45 HAZID's in-depth and time-consuming analysis can counterbalance any omissions that can come of analysts' lack of experience as in the case of FMECA. Also, since FMECA covers mainly equipment failure modes and effects, HAZID comes to fill the gap in safety-related studies.
BBN
Reasoning with uncertainty is common in all aspects of everyday life, so dealing with it has forced scientists even from sixteenth century to develop several approaches such as the frequentist or the subjective Bayesian that was widely adopted in more recent years. BBNs (also known as belief networks, causal probabilistic networks, causal nets, graphical probability networks, and probabilistic cause-effect models) were first developed in 1980s and they are based in statistics and artificial intelligence and they provide a simple way of building a ''picture'' of a decision problem. They make a framework for decision support that takes into consideration variables with unknown state and influence on outcomes. So, it is basically a tool for modeling under uncertainty using conditional probabilistic calculations and graphical representation of the logical relationships between variables. This method is a more flexible tool than other methods (FTA, dynamic fault tree analysis (DFTA), ETA, etc.) as it can combine objective and subjective data like expert judgment and can resolve some disadvantages that more traditional methods have intrinsic limitations such as system and component interconnectivities in multiple layers so that they simulate real state conditions, fault detection, and system degradation. [46] [47] [48] The approach is based on conceptualizing a model domain of interest as a graph of connected nodes and linkages. In the graph, nodes represent variables (X = X 1 , . . . , X i , . . . , X n ) and arcs represent direct connections between them (X i ! X j ). Probabilistic relations rather than deterministic are used to describe the dependency relations. 48 The construction of a BBN is simple but as the variables increase in number, the complexity rises. The arrow illustrates that the parent node has a direct influence on the child node. D and E do not have any parents and are called root nodes. A does not have any descendants and it is called leaf. The conditional probabilities are specified for each node to represent the influence of the parent nodes on its value using the chain rule from probability theory 
Thus, the BBN structure represents the independence between the variables using conditional probabilities that represent the degree of belief in these relationships. 46 Main advantage of this method is the comprehensible graphic display of interrelation of examined system and failure modes.
BBN construction has four stages: The first two stages are problem structuring. In these stages, the variables are identified and expressed as statistical variables, and the network structure is decided. The third stage is instantiation. In this stage, the conditional probabilities that may be derived from data or based on expert judgment are specified and the assessment functions are determined. The fourth stage is inference. In this stage, evidence, in the form of knowledge about the states of the variables, is used to update the probabilities of all nodes by efficient algorithms. This procedure is called propagation and it can be quite difficult to perform as exact propagation is only feasible for small networks or discrete variables. Approximation algorithms though have been developed for larger networks and continuous variables. 47 Offshore renewable energy sector has seen numerous developments in the last few years as shown above, and undoubtedly has a promising future. Keeping this in mind, a risk analysis methodology suggested for implementation on a wind farm is presented in the next section.
Methodology
In this section, a flowchart with the suggested risk analysis methodology is shown in Figure 2 .
The first step is to decompose a wind turbine and identify its main components as well as the activity areas that we are interested in. The next stage is the determination of the acceptance criteria so that the results of the risk analysis are compared with some predefined standards. After this stage, the risk analysis' main part takes place. At first, HAZID and hazard assessment are done. Then, the risk management is conducted, where the potential hazards have to be eliminated or prevented from occurring. Also, BBN analysis was used to identify the most costly components in case of failure. Finally, a number of proper pro-active measures are proposed to mitigate the effects. More specifically, after the first step, a set of 16 sub-assemblies and main parts was extracted (Table 1) .
Later on, the activity areas that we are interested in are identified and more specifically installation, and operation and maintenance of an offshore wind turbine. Keeping these in mind, we can now proceed with the risk identification using FMECA and HAZID methods.
With the FMECA, we identified the most critical components of a wind turbine since this method reviews the ways in which a system can fail and then the consequences of these failures. As mentioned in the previous section, severity, detection, and occurrence tables are Tables 2-4 . The RPN can now be calculated as a product of the occurrence index, the detection index, and the severity index. In this way, the risk levels that came out of the possible outcomes and vary from low to high are illustrated with a range of different colors (green-low risk, least significant to red-high risk, most significant as shown in Table 5 .
The consequence, probability, and detection indexes are reviewed in terms of Personnel safety (S), Environmental protection (E), Asset integrity (A), and Operation of the device (O). Consecutively risk and RPN indexes are calculated in the same terms. Finally, an FMECA matrix is formed as shown in Figure 3 where the potential risks and failure modes of the subassemblies are identified. The HAZID method is used to identify the potential hazards during manufacture, transportation, installation, and operation and maintenance. These hazards can be linked to the turbines, such as lifting operations and occupational dangers, or indirectly, for example, bad weather or fire. We repeat the same procedure as in FMECA method with the difference that a risk index instead of the RPN index is now calculated. The form of the matrix is shown in Figure 4 .
All direct as well as the indirect hazards of above activities are analyzed for a better understanding of all the potential risks involved. Direct hazards concern those directly related to the wind turbine such as operation of remotely operated vehicles (ROVs), underwater installation. Indirect hazards concern the ones related to the overall installation activity including the assisting vessels and crew (e.g. electrical shock, pollution, bad weather).
Risk management comes after the identification and assessment of the potential hazards. Risks on top of ranking have to be dealt with either by designing them out in the initial stages of a wind turbine by preventing them to occur or by alleviating the effects in case they occur. Finally, and most importantly, pro-active measures and emergency response actions for preventing reoccurrence should be taken. Finally, a cost-benefit analysis of the repair costs based on the output of the risk assessment will be carried out. The above was performed by using BBNs with the aid of HUGIN software.
The novelty of this research paper lies in the combination of three different methods for risk analysis and criticality identification. The integration of these risk assessment tools eliminates their potential drawbacks while also assists in the decision-making of owners and operators of offshore wind assets. Pairing HAZID and FMECA methods in the first stage of risk analysis provides for a more comprehensive approach since it considers both the mechanical and the operational aspects of an offshore wind turbine. In addition, using BBN analysis provides the opportunity not only to identify the most costly components, but also compare the results with the other two methods regarding the most critical components and their failure probabilities. Also, BBN method provides the dynamic representation between parent and child nodes in an effective, fast, and direct way. Its graphical way of representation depicts effectively all system and components and their correlation.
Results
In this section, the results of the FMECA, HAZID, and BBN tools are shown. It is important to mention all results related to the highest-ranked critical components and hazards identified by the FMECA are mentioned. In addition to the above, the results with lower ranked indices are provided as well including severe consequences such as multiple injuries, fatalities or collapse of the mentioned systems.
FMECA results
For the identification of the most critical components, we valued each of the components' failure causes with regard to detection, consequence, and probability of failure for all four categories of interest. Taking as an example the pitch motor overloading, one of the most common failure causes based on past research, we can explain the ranking procedure more efficiently. Regarding Asset, we valued consequence with 4, since a shutdown of the turbine would have major impact on the energy production. For the same category, we valued probability with 5 since overloading is a common incident, not only due to sensitivity of electrical parts but also due to high winds common in offshore areas. Also due to presence of sensors that can easily detect a fault, we ranked detection with 2. By taking their product, we calculate the RPN for this failure mode for Asset category
Consecutively, we calculated all RPNs for the other three categories for this failure mode of pitch system and in this respect for all components accordingly. After ranking the components in terms of Safety, Asset, Environment, and Operation, based on their RPN, as shown in Figure 3 , we can summarize the results in one total ranking of components (Tables 6 and 7) .
As shown in above tables, the most sensitive component of the wind turbine in terms of Safety is the Tower as the consequences of a potential collapse would be catastrophic not only in case of fatalities but also in all categories. Furthermore, the absence of sensors at the tower increases the possibility of undetected flaws that could lead to a possible failure compared to other components. The same applies for the foundation. The above results can be validated by the study of Dinmohammadi and Shafiee 51 in which the Tower is ranked in the first place.
As can be seen, the foundation is the most failure prone component of the wind turbine in terms of environmental relevance. This is due to the foundation being in close contact with the sea and seabed. Moreover, there are no sensors installed which could detect any abnormalities during actual turbine operation. Also, rotor blades can be a danger to the environment as they are responsible in many cases for bird fatality but not up to a great degree. Dinmohammadi and Shaffiee's study validates the above results for the Tower, Foundation, as well as rotor blades top ranking. We can see though that in general, the RPNs are low in absolute values not only due to most of the components being in direct contact with the environment, but also due to legislation necessitating developers to consider all relevant measures for environmental protection.
As far as Asset is concerned, the most sensitive component of the wind turbine is Pitch system not only due to high probability of failure, but also because its failure means low energy production and thus less income generated for the company. The same applies for the yaw system but although their probability and consequence indexes are high. Their detection indexes are low since there are a lot of sensors that could identify potential problems. Most of the RPNs in this category are high since any deviation from the normal operation costs a lot of money. Pitch system and yaw system are also in the highest ranks of causes that can cause the biggest downtime in the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) studies 49, 50 and the two components with the greatest contribution to failure.
Finally, as already depicted in Tables 6-7 , pitch system plays an important role within the operation of a wind turbine, as it is one of the main components for the energy production, and consequently, it is placed at the top of the criticality ranking. Overall, the Operation category is, as we can observe the one with the highest RPN indexes, since small operating disruptions are frequent as shown above.
Concluding the most critical component is the pitch system since it is among the top ranking of criticality. Considering that electronic systems are sensitive and prone to failures, it is justified that its probability index is high in most of the cases. Also, as already said, the existence of sensors lowers the detection index, but the importance of its malfunction causes the consequence index to raise. As a result, we have a total RPN index of 40 in most of the cases which ranks pitch system first in criticality terms. This is followed by rotor blades and foundation which demonstrate a high RPN value due to high consequence index. The latter denotes that a potential failure of the blades will have an impact on the energy production whereas a potential failure of the foundation can eventually lead to fatalities. It is important to note that the above results are in accordance with past studies performed in the same sector. [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] Proper monitoring and maintenance can diminish the failure probabilities for most of the components. Thus, as a general recommendation, offshore wind turbine maintenance should take place in shorter time intervals instead of every 2 year that is now the average inspection and maintenance frequency.
HAZID results
As far as the HAZID analysis is concerned again, the hazards are evaluated in terms of Safety, Asset, Environment, and Operation and summarized for each category. Below are the highest risks summarized for each category and their risk indexes in brackets.
During the manufacturing process in Safety terms, electrical hazard due to human error (36) or poor communication between workers (24) appears to be the greatest hazard, while in all other aspects of the manufacturing process, the risk indexes are rather low as most of the operations are automated and human factor is not widely involved. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 61 studies also refer to exposure to chemicals as a major factor.
Similarly, during the transportation process, in terms of Safety, Environment, Operation, and Asset, collision between crew transfer vessel (CTV), field support vessel (FSV), jack-up vessels, helicopters, and wind turbines during worker's transportation due to bad weather (36) or human error (24) , as well as load falls during unload due to bad weather (27) , human error (24) , or poor communication between workers (24), are highly ranked hazards as well. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and OSHA 61 refer to all of the above causes of risk during transportation stages validating the present results.
During the installation process, where a vast number of humans are present, Safety criteria play an important role as expected, and hazards are present in all stages. Main areas of concern are collision between CTV and FSV or wind turbines during worker's transportation due to bad weather (36), workers' fall from heights due to human error (36) , poor communication between workers (36) or bad weather conditions (36) , electrical shock due to human error (36) or poor communication between workers (36), fire or explosion due to fuel hose failure, ignition sources available, fuel tanks overflow, poor communication, human error (45), hot work on deck, poor housekeeping or hot work during bunkering (36) , physiological hazards due to personnel slips, trips and falls (36) or man overboard (36) , hazards during cable installation due to entangled cables around foundation during installation (36), or trawling capsizing from accidental dragging (36) . In the same way, in terms of Environment, Asset, and Operations, major hazards are dropped/swinging equipment/device/tethers while installing, lowering/retrieving from water due to poor communication (24) , stability loss of vessel due to cargo shifting (24) , and fire or explosion due to fuel hose failure, ignition sources available, fuel tanks overflow, poor communication, or human error (27) . Although not in rating order falls, fire or explosion and ergonomics are mentioned as top hazards in OSHA directives. 61 They also appear in high frequency in IRSST (Institut de recherche Robert-Sauve´en santeé t en se´curite´du travail) and Caithness accident database. 60, 62 During the operation process, where human factor is usually not present hazards are mainly linked with components' failure. In Safety and Operation aspects, main causes of hazard are fire or explosion of turbine due to lightning (36) or strong winds (24) , weather hazards due to ice throw/fall (27) or lightning, transportation hazards due to bad weather conditions (27) , or human error (27) . In Asset terms additionally, tower collapse due to buckling failure caused by exceeded design loads (36) or improper installation of the tower-fastening system (24) can lead to unavailability of the asset and thus income loss. In terms of Environment though, sea and seabed pollution due to noise and vibration (18) contributes more to potential hazards.
Similarly to the installation process, during the maintenance process, a number of hazards are highlighted. These refer to electrical shock and workers' fall due to human error (36) , poor communication between co-workers (36), physiological hazards due to entry to confined spaces (tanks, store rooms, etc.) (30) . In addition to the above, personnel slips, trips, and falls (36) or man overboard (36) as well as hazards during cable or foundation maintenance due to entangled cables around foundation during installation (36) or trawling capsizing from accidental dragging (36) are also identified. All of the above mainly concern Safety, Asset, and Operations criteria.
In an effort to interpret ranking of risks that are present in each of the stages of the wind farm's life, we can see that in the case of manufacturing, it is observed that the biggest hazard is electrical shock either by human error or poor communication between the workers. This is reasonable since most of the manufacturing processes are automated and electricity is the only source of hazard that workers may come in touch with. This also justifies why all the other risk indexes in the manufacturing process are very low.
As far as transportation is concerned, we can see that collision between vessels or vessels and other means of transportation, such as helicopters, is the lead cause of failure in all four aspects of risk analysis. Human error or bad weather conditions are the main reasons for that. Collisions can have a huge impact not only in Safety, since human lives can be lost but also in Environment as harmful substances can be spilled in the sea and in Asset and Operation as lost or destroyed components mean a lot of time and money loss for the company. Also, load falls during the loading and unloading sequence of turbine components is another major hazard with regards to transportation.
During the installation process, the major hazards are related to safety as it is the only stage of a turbine's life that a large number of workers are involved. A large range of hazards that could lead to injuries or fatalities is present during this stage including among others collision between transportation means, falls from heights, electrical shocks, fires or explosions, but also severe physiological hazards. Nevertheless, due to the increased number of procedures implemented during the installation process, a lot of diverse hazards appear in terms of operation, asset, and environment. These involve the stability loss of vessels, dropped/ swinging equipment/device/tethers while installation takes place, tower collapse due to improper installation of the base. It should be considered that any potential hazards identified as per above should be minimized/ avoided in order to avoid unnecessary which could lead to increased unavailability and potential loss of generated income. As seen above, it can be suggested that in the case of maintenance, most of the hazards are in common with the installation stage.
In the same manner, in operation process, no personnel or external factors are involved with the turbine. Thus, the human factor does not play an important role at this stage. Since the turbine is unmanned, safety is not of as great importance as it was for the other stages. Exceeding loads, such as aerodynamic, hydrodynamic, slamming, ice load, and fatigue from waves, 57, 58 and operational malfunction though can have serious impacts in Environmental, Asset, and Operation terms. Weather conditions are the main failure causes during the operation process. Weather is a considerable risk factor as all assembly techniques can only be done in calm sea. Work becomes extremely difficult or dangerous in rough sea and project delays may occur. These temporary interruptions of work mean huge increase in the construction cost of offshore wind farms.
Concluding, Safety is a top priority area during all stages of a wind turbine's lifecycle since there is interference with human lives, and that can be seen from the high-risk indexes in the risk matrix. Additionally, capital loss may be of great interest to the company and that is obvious since Asset and Operation also have high-risk indexes in most of the failure causes along the risk matrix.
Moreover the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, 59 Caithness database, IRSST, 60 and US Department of Labor 61 validate the results regarding the frequency and severity of hazards where the human factor is involved as described in above sections.
BBN results
The BBN method complements the previous analysis conducted using HAZID and FMECA and can confirm or refute the results not only by identifying the most costly components, but also compare the results with the other two methods regarding the most critical components and their failure probabilities. The key feature of BBNs is their ability to model and reason about uncertainty and their graphical, articulate appearance ( Figures 5-8) .
BBN can be quite complex and it may be necessary to break it down to subcategories. In this case, we avoid computational intensive and time-consuming process. In our approach, we divided the main system into 11 subsystems. When necessary, in complicated systems, a further division was made to simplify the calculations into categories such as electrical failure, structural failure, human error, and external parameters as in Figures 5-8 .
More specifically, the 11 subsystems were as follows: cables, foundation, yaw, transformer, tower, rotor blades, pitch, main frame, power generation, rotor hub, and gearbox. Due to plethora and diversity of failure modes, cables subsystem was further divided into electrical failure, structural failure, and external parameters. For the same reasons, foundation was divided into structural failure, fatigue, and human errors. In a similar way, pitch system's subcategories were structural failure, electrical failure, overloading, and other causes (structures as shown on other studies). 53, 54, 62 After implementing the data for each subcategory, as for example shown in Table 8 for pitch system, we identified and ranked the most critical components and their probability of failure (Table 9 ). In the final stages of our approach, we incorporated the annual cost estimate for each component in order to get an approximation of the total annual cost in case of failure. (Table  10) .
Summarized results of the probability of total failure and the associated cost elements are presented in Table 11 .
For the calculation of the wind turbine failure probability, the data used for each component's failure are not absolute failure probabilities of each subsystem but percentage contribution to the overall failure of a turbine as actual figures are hard to find in the newly established wind energy industry. Additionally, the figures of the failure causes of each component are taken from OREDA oil and gas handbook and are actual. Thus, there is also a parameter of uncertainty and error in the calculations.
That is most likely the main reason for obtaining such a high probability of failure. The total annual cost in case of failure is 115398.75$ (Table 11) , that is relatively low compared to the cost of the components, respectively, since the top critical subsystems are relatively inexpensive. In this respect, Table 12 presents the failure modes and probabilities for the yaw and rotor blades system. As mentioned above, the values used in the calculations are taken from the OREDA Handbook that it is more specifically for oil and gas industry. Since offshore wind turbines are a relatively new way of producing energy, there is a lack of accurate data regarding risk and criticality analysis so there is a parameter of error in the calculations, although we compare similar equipment types and operational conditions. Despite this, results have an adequate level of accuracy and can be verified by past studies. The system with the highest failure probability is yaw system and is followed by rotor blades and power generation system. At some point, this is justified as all of them are electrical systems and they are more sensitive to failures than mechanical systems.
The overall failure probability of the wind turbine is relatively high. This can be due to data error since the values used as failure probabilities of failure causes are taken from the OREDA Handbook which is more specifically used for oil and gas industry. Another parameter of error is inserted with the use of percentage contribution of each subsystem to the overall failure of a turbine instead of absolute failure probabilities. The overall cost of the wind turbine in case of failure is relatively low compared to the components' costs, respectively, since the top critical subsystems are relatively cheap.
Verification of this study can also be achieved by comparing the results of the BBN tool to the ones from FMECA. The ranking of the critical components derived by HUGIN program is up to a satisfactory level similar to the results provided by FMECA. It can be also observed that the yaw system, power generation system, and gearbox are among the top ranked components in both FMECA and BBN tools.
Conclusion and recommendations for future research
Reliability prediction is considered as a crucial measure to understand system performance for minimizing maintenance cost and mitigate unnecessary downtime. In addition, imperfect maintenance is identified as one of the typical drawbacks in operation and maintenance practices that reduce system reliability. In this work, we used a combined research methodology for the risk analysis and the prediction of the long-term reliability of an offshore wind turbine's subsystems. The key elements presented in this report are as follows:
Review of risk analysis and risk assessment methods in renewables, maritime, and oil and gas sector, as well as their tools and software. Presentation of a risk analysis and decision-making methodology for implementation of the offshore wind turbine sector. A novel technique for predicting system reliability is provided through this approach by combining HAZID, FMECA, and BBN analysis. Development of a detailed risk matrix to be used for all activities of the wind turbine as well as for the critical components. Identification of the hazards in all activities in the lifetime of the turbine. Identification of the high-ranked hazardous areas in all activities in the lifetime of the turbine and its components. Identification of the most costly components of a wind turbine.
Additionally, the present research study provides an initial step for expanding into further research in risk and criticality analysis. The main recommendation that may enhance the proposed methodology is a further investigation into gathering additional and more accurate information about the offshore wind industry since implementation of the onshore data can lead to significant errors. Furthermore, more maintenance details could be implemented in the BBNs so that more informative and proper decisions can be made on behalf of Table 12 . Failure modes and probability of failure for the yaw and rotor blades system.
Yaw system Insufficient torque to drive motor from internal leakage or valve failure 0.425 Failure to pinion rotation from blockage or foreign object between gear teeth, sheared shaft, or cracked pinion housing and bearing 0.0424
Rotor blade
Rotor lightning 0.34 Power generation system Slip ring failure due to misalignment, pearing stuck, lightning, or dirty insulation 0.0614 Incorrect signal on stabilizer circuit due to sensor failure 0.0555 Unauthorized entry due to vandal, thief, or curiosity seeker 0.0422 Excitation incorrect output due to age or circuit deterioration 0.0341 Closure failure on line ground current relay due to loss of CT (Continuous-Time) signal, relay mechanical, or electrical failure 0.001 the decision-makers about the maintenance strategy. To obtain more realistic reliability result, it is also suggested that the different kinds of maintenance strategy (i.e. planned, preventive, corrective, breakdown) are taken into consideration. A sensitivity study on the conditional probability tables could also be a part of future research for accurate verification of the results.
Also, BBN analysis could be implemented for the HAZID analysis as well so that the costs, in case the most critical operations occur, could be calculated. Finally, future research could include a more elaborate, sophisticated risk-based analysis considering the explicit formulation of a numerical optimization problem to be solved for the global minimum (optimal solution). Furthermore, the time-dependent character of the problem would be explicitly considered by modeling the involved dynamics via non-stationary stochastic processes. [64] [65] [66] The above recommendations can improve reliability and criticality analysis that are beneficial for obtaining optimum maintenance strategy and prevent risks and hazards of an offshore wind turbine.
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